



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXI NUMBER 17

Japan and Communist Trade

by Robert A. Scalapino

Most discussions of Japanese economic relations with Red China and the U.S.S.R. invariably raise several basic questions: Is there a reasonable substitute for the old China trade? In any case, can Japan do business with Communist China or Russia? If this is possible, can some compromise satisfactory to Japan, the United States and the Communists be found? Definite answers to these questions probably await future developments, but it is possible to explore the central facts and arguments involved.

To evaluate the importance for Japan of trade with Communist countries one should first note certain trends in the over-all postwar Japanese trade pattern. Thus far, its most significant aspect has been the strong rise, percentage-wise, of trade with the United States and the sharp decline in the proportion of trade with Asia, especially in imports. Asian imports, representing 58 percent of the total Japanese import trade in 1935, had fallen to 25 percent in 1951.¹ This decline

1. These statistics and others used in this article are taken from *Shin Asia no sangyo to boeki* (*The Production and Trade of the New Asia*), published by National Economic Research Association, Tokyo, December 1951.

can be easily explained in terms of two factors: the loss of "Greater Japan," particularly Korea, Formosa and Sakhalin; and the destruction of the China-Manchuria trade. The former territories, which produced 30 percent of Japanese imports and took 25 percent of its exports in 1935, represented only 5 percent of each in 1951. The China trade was also of vital significance in the prewar period, although after 1931 it was primarily trade with Japanese-controlled Manchukuo. In 1935 "China trade" totaled 11.5 percent of all Japanese imports (Manchukuo, 7.1 percent) and 17.4 percent of exports (Manchukuo, 12.9 percent); in 1951 these percentages for a united China had dropped to 0.6 percent and 1.1 percent respectively. Postwar trade increases with Hong Kong and Malaya, both reshipment areas, would augment the figure slightly, but increases here were relatively minor, especially in 1951.

Deprived of Northeast Asian trade, Japan has had to go nearly halfway around the world for certain key resources, has been placed under much greater expense, and has become far more dependent on the American

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dollar. Moreover, Japan must now compete for the Southeast Asian market more vigorously than ever. Recently, to be sure, a note of guarded optimism has emerged concerning the possibility of offsetting a permanently shrunken China-trade through advances in South Asia and Formosa, provided American financial assistance is forthcoming. The latter condition in some form is generally regarded as indispensable.

Hope for China Trade

Even so, as much trade as possible with China and the U.S.S.R. remains the goal of most interested Japanese. Stout resistance is foreseen to further Japanese advances in South Asian trade, particularly from the British. Trade expansion with postwar Formosa is certainly limited, especially since the island now has its own priorities and is not completely integrated into the Japanese economy. American aid, moreover, must remain uncertain in terms of type, amount and duration. In addition, the China trade in particular has been so traditional, so logical and previously so profitable that its permanent abandonment on a large scale is almost inconceivable to Japan.

But even if the China trade should be important—perhaps crucial—to the Japanese economy, what limitations will be imposed by the Chinese Communists? Skeptics point to broad policy pronouncements such as that by Liu Shao-ch'i, vice-chairman of the "Central People's Government" of Communist China, who has stated, "We will now retake from

imperialism the key of foreign trade. . . . Now, China's raw materials will be directed first toward internal production needs." Many Japanese doubt that such important raw materials as coal can now be obtained from China in any significant quantity. Peiping's new program of planned industrialization, with its numerous concomitants such as rigorous state control over foreign trade and drastic reductions in imported consumer goods, may not augur well for such Japanese exports as textiles. On the other hand, Japanese speculation about China trade continues to indicate a considerable degree of hope. A China on the road to industrialization will need unlimited quantities of steel, machinery and chemicals—all important Japanese exports. It is widely felt that in its own self-interest, Communist China will desire large-scale trade with Japan sufficiently to work out mutually beneficial agreements—provided political obstacles can be removed.

Russia's Role

Russian trade, in contrast to that of China, has not been very important to Japan in the past. Fisheries agreements between the two countries, however, have always been of vital consequence. Now, moreover, new factors enter the picture, such as the premium on general trade expansion, Russian control of Sakhalin and, above all, the possible connection between Russian and Chinese agreements. For various reasons, therefore, the Russians have found many Japanese listeners to their re-

cent overtures regarding trade. Some circles were definitely interested in the proposals of the Soviet trade representative, Andrei I. Dominitsky, to export Russian lumber and coal for Japanese fishing craft. Much interest was also shown among Japanese business groups in sending a delegation to the International Economic Conference in Moscow, despite government disapproval. Perfectly conscious of Moscow's political motivations, many Japanese industrialists nevertheless argue that the governing principle must be Japanese advantage—that while trade with North-east Asia may indeed play a less important role in the future, Japan should not shun such possibilities as may exist, providing they are of benefit to Japan.

All things considered, few Japanese desire to write off Communist trade as unimportant or uninteresting. On the contrary, the current trade offensive being conducted by the Communists is finding considerable reception. And if the British-Chinese trade agreements announced from Moscow should materialize, repercussions in Japan will be immediate. Because of trade prospects, even the government of Premier Yoshida, in its foreign policy, seeks to leave the door ajar for future possibilities. Thereby, while making clear its political preferences, it hopes to cope with current pressures and retain a degree of policy flexibility attuned to Japanese interests and Asian uncertainties.

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NATO's Armament Problems

The effort of the United States to lead its North Atlantic coalition partners toward the creation of military strength that the Soviet Union will respect has entered a period fraught with anxiety.

The real strength of the alliance has so far been the unity of purpose which has joined the allied governments in North America and Europe in a common determination to repel any aggressive step by the Kremlin in Europe. Our allies, however, have hitherto resisted the exhortation General Dwight D. Eisenhower included in his first report of April 2 as supreme commander of the North Atlantic forces in Europe—that the Europeans quickly transform this unity of spirit into formal military, economic and even political unity. Otherwise, he implied, the hope of building a barrier to Soviet ambition will prove to be vain.

Congress and Europe

American policy planners face a grave dilemma. On the one hand, Europeans often show resentment of American preachings about unity. If Washington continues to press Western Europe on this subject, it runs the danger of destroying the strong spirit of common purpose. On the other hand, unless this pressure is applied, there is danger that Congress will not adequately support the North Atlantic policy. The action of the House of Representatives in cutting \$4.1 billion from the current military budget and in recalling \$6 billion from the budget approved last year has so disturbed President Truman that on April 18 in his address to the AMVETS he threatened to call Congress into special session

this summer unless it provides the sums he considers necessary for defense. The American military budget is a fundamental source of military strength for Europe. The resistance on both sides of the Atlantic to the promptings of United States policy-makers threatens to transform the program of strength into a display of weakness. Divisions among the allies can hearten only the Soviet Union.

Actual and Possible Strength

The problem of American policy-planners is to reconcile Congress and the European governments. Progress made so far in the rearmament of the West is not yet a source of strength. On the eve of General Eisenhower's withdrawal from his NATO command, the West (excluding non-ally but friendly Yugoslavia) has about 20 divisions available to defend the approaches to the Atlantic Ocean from Eastern Europe, compared with 215 or 225 at the disposal of the Soviet Union and its allies.

The Allied military force can be increased by the conclusion of the war in Indo-China (an unlikely prospect for some time), which could release a few French divisions for European service and improve the ability of France economically to support a stronger force in Europe, and by the establishment of the international army proposed for the European Defense Community. One difficulty in the way of creating the Community was recently eased by the British government's announcement in a White Paper that it would give military support to any power in the Community subjected to armed attack. At best those two de-

velopments would raise the strength in being of the Atlantic alliance forces in Europe to 50 divisions.

Rearmament imposes a constant strain on good relations between Europe and the United States. In Britain the Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers' Union, with a membership of 350,000, at its annual conference at Easter, swung over to the policy of Aneurin Bevan, who favors restriction of rearmament and greater emphasis on economic development. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions is to hold a meeting in Brussels in May to determine whether rearmament has helped or damaged trade unionism in Europe.

Another source of friction is the continued inability of the United States, as a result of congressional prohibition, to share with the NATO allies its atomic weapons or its knowledge about their production. Each atomic advance leaves our allies further behind us and more clearly exposes them to the atomic power of an enemy in case of war. A problem seldom discussed is the delay of the United States in fulfilling its commitments to provide arms to the allies. The Department of Defense falls behind as it tries to satisfy the needs of American forces at home and in Korea as well as requirements in Europe. The whole gamut of problems connected with the rearming of Western Europe raises the question whether the United States, which now places its chief emphasis on military strength, should pay more attention to other considerations in its attempt to balance off the power of Russia.

BLAIR BOLLES



Should U.S. Negotiate with Russia About Germany?

by James P. Warburg

Mr. Warburg is the author of the recently published book, *How to Co-exist Without Playing the Kremlin's Game* (New York, Beacon Press, 1952), and many other books and pamphlets on foreign affairs.

IN THE FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN of December 1, 1951 this observer discussed the question, "Do we want a united Germany on our terms, if we can get it?" It was pointed out that the two great obstacles of the past might be found no longer to exist. These had been Moscow's insistence upon reparations and its unwillingness to permit the unification of Germany as a democracy in the Western sense. A plea was made for serious exploration of this possibility and for willingness to give up the idea of West German military contingents in NATO if, thereby, our avowed aim of creating a unified, democratic and demilitarized Germany could be attained.

The Soviet note of March 10 disposed of the question of reparations. Except for ambiguity as to the holding of free elections, it also disposed of Russia's former unwillingness to permit a united Germany to become a democracy in the Western sense, specifically proposing the free activity of democratic parties and organizations as well as the guarantee of "the rights of man and basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction and assembly."

The Soviet note, however, introduced two new obstacles: insistence upon recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier; and a sudden reversal as to militarization, permitting the new united Germany to have limited defense forces and to manufacture arms and equipment for those forces. The latter proposal was coupled with the stipulation that the new Germany should contract not to enter

any coalition or alliance "against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany."

The Western reply of March 25 raised three major points:

1. *Did Russia really mean to permit free elections?* If so, would it permit the UN Commission to investigate whether the conditions precedent to free elections exist in Russian-occupied East Germany?

In substance this point was well taken, but the insistence upon prior UN investigation seems rather silly. Obviously, the Commission would find that the necessary conditions do not exist now. The question is not whether they exist but whether the Kremlin is willing to let them be created. Moscow has said as much in its reply.

2. *Frontiers.* It has always been obvious that a unified, neutral and demilitarized Germany, even if democratic, would be a danger to the West so long as Russia held the trump card of being able to grant or dangle as bait the return of all or part of the amputated eastern provinces. As long ago as 1946 this observer proposed reopening this question and submitted to Washington a specific revision to be suggested by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M. Molotov at Paris. This proposal was to finalize the annexation of East Prussia and Upper Silesia but to return to Germany the farmland of Pomerania, eastern Brandenburg and Lower Silesia.

The reasons for this proposal were as follows: (1) East Prussia has been

a strategically provocative enclave; its annexation by Poland (though not by Russia) could be justified (if any annexations were justified) as compensation to Poland for Russia's annexation of Eastern Poland; (2) The coal and industry of Upper Silesia were not essential to a peaceful Germany but would give the new "Poland an economy" desirably balanced between industry and agriculture; (3) Polish annexation of Pomerania, eastern Brandenburg and Lower Silesia had given Poland more farmland than it needed and had deprived Germany of the normal source of 25 percent of its foodstuffs, thereby unbalancing its economy.

Instead of approaching Mr. Molotov with a specific proposition, Mr. Byrnes went to Stuttgart and sought to curry favor with the Germans by simply announcing that the Oder-Neisse frontier could not be considered a finality. This enabled Moscow to charge that we were proposing to give back to Germany not only its breadbasket but its "eastern arsenal" as well. That ended the matter until now, when our government has, at long last, been forced to take the position it should have taken years ago. But in its note of March 25 Washington has still failed to indicate what sort of a readjustment it seeks and thus to make clear that it would be satisfied with something less than a complete reversal of the Potsdam annexations.

3. *Militarization and neutrality.* Our government clearly has no choice but to oppose a *rearmed* uni-

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by Philip E. Mosely

Dr. Mosely, since 1946 professor of international relations at the Russian Institute of Columbia University, was a member of the United States delegations to the Moscow conference of 1943, the Potsdam conference of 1945 and the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1945-46.

AN ADEQUATE discussion of the question whether the United States should negotiate with Russia about Germany requires, first of all, examination of the real motives and purposes of the Kremlin in proposing, at this time, unification of the West and East sections of Germany on the basis of "free elections."

Is the Soviet government willing to scuttle its "People's Democratic Republic" in Eastern Germany in order to achieve the creation of a "neutral" Germany precariously balanced between East and West? Or is Moscow simply trying by propaganda tricks to avert or postpone the integration of West Germany into the Atlantic community, while it gains time to press on with the remilitarization, already well-advanced, of the Soviet zone?

In none of the Soviet notes, including that of March 10, has there been any concrete indication that the Soviet government is remotely willing to allow genuinely free elections in its own zone. Just think what free elections would mean: abolition of the Soviet-trained political police; scrapping of Soviet-style controls over trade unions, peasant organizations, youth groups, and removal of most of the Soviet-approved officials; and freedom for all parties to publish newspapers, have equal use of the radio, hold meetings, organize their local and national units. Free elections would mean the destruction by Soviet fiat of the system of rigid controls in advance of the formal balloting.

The Soviet rulers of East Germany must know that except for a part of

the postwar youth, their subjects are bitterly hostile to Soviet control. Genuine freedom would mean freedom to express their true feelings. Even if the political leaders of West Germany agreed that a reunited Germany should remain outside all power-groupings, the liberated people of East Germany, like those of West Berlin, would be the first to demand protection against a revived Soviet domination through joining the West.

Soviet Economic Stake

Has the Soviet government the slightest notion of giving up its large economic stake in East Germany, in order to make a united Germany truly independent? Today the SAG's (Sowjet-Aktien-Gesellschaften) account for 20 to 30 percent of the productive wealth of the Soviet zone and form a state within a state. The most important factories and mines became Soviet property because Soviet commissars walked in and declared them so. The SAG's import what they wish without paying duties, and export their products and profits to the Soviet Union without paying any taxes to the puppet state. If the SAG's remain in their present status, they will be a spreading cancer in the body of all Germany, as they are today in the Soviet zone.

In its note of March 10 the Soviet government, for the first time since 1945, omitted mention of the \$10 billion in reparation which it had previously set as the first condition for consenting to cooperate with its wartime allies in carrying out the Potsdam agreements. As a matter of

fact, estimates of the amount of reparation already taken from Germany vary between 9 and 17 billion dollars, and today the Soviet Union is extracting around \$2 billion a year through the device of the SAG's and of one-sided trade agreements. From a reunited Germany the Soviet Union could probably extract between 4 and 5 billion dollars a year. In the peace treaties with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria the Soviet Union deprived the captive governments of the right even to discuss the nationalization of Soviet-owned properties. Would it be more careless in protecting its valuable factories and mines in Germany?

What Kind of Elections?

When the Soviet note says that the four occupying powers should supervise "free elections" in Germany, it means that the Soviet authorities will insure the "freedom" of the Communist-run Socialist Unity party to secure 100 percent of the votes in the Eastern zone. It is not at all clear that the Soviet government has abandoned its repeated demand for the creation of a provisional German National Council on a basis of "parity." What does "parity" mean? The proposed Council would have an equal number of members from the Soviet zone, with its 19 million inhabitants, and from Western Germany, with its 49 millions. Then, a single craven or corrupt member from the West, voting with the well-disciplined East German bloc, would create a "democratic majority" of one, which could then proceed to set up for all Germany a centralized "people's democracy" in which the Soviet-type political police and party militia would henceforth "protect democracy."

Is the Soviet government really willing to give up control of this

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Warburg

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fied Germany unless it intends to jettison France in favor of Germany as its major ally on the Continent. But the position we have taken is, to say the least, ambiguous. We object to remilitarization of a neutral Germany as "a step backward," but then we insist that the new Germany shall be free to "enter into association with other countries" and announce that we "plan to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European community." Thus we clearly imply that we think it would not be "a step backward" if a unified Germany were allowed to rearm in order to place its armed forces under NATO control.

Subject to some sort of agreement as to the eastern frontier, Russia has said, "You can have the kind of Germany you want if the settlement removes once and for all the threat of West German participation in NATO." We have replied, "Give us our kind of Germany, and we shall carry out our plan; only instead of incorporating *West* Germany in

NATO, we shall include *all* of Germany." How stupid do we think Stalin can be?

The key to the whole problem of the European peace is, quite simply, whether or not we shall now have the sense to give up an unsound, dangerous and essentially futile plan,¹ provided that we can obtain what

1. The author's reasons for this judgment of the present NATO plan are stated in a pamphlet, "Last Chance in Germany," just issued by the Current Affairs Press, New York.

we wisely wanted before that plan was dreamed up in Washington and forced down the throats of our friends abroad.

No one can say that at this late date a successful negotiation is still possible. It may or may not be. But this nation will have assumed a fearful responsibility if we do not patiently and sincerely explore this last opportunity before we commit ourselves and our friends beyond recall.

Mosely

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valuable colony, which is at the same time an instrument of political blackmail? Moscow no longer hopes, as it did from 1945 until the abandonment of the Berlin blockade in 1949, to extend its control directly over all of Germany. Its next best move is to attempt in every way to delay the integration of West Germany into the Atlantic community.

The Western powers should begin negotiations promptly with the Soviet government on the essential condi-

tions for the creation of a genuinely democratic regime for all Germany, and the West German Republic should take part in them, for the time has passed when the Big Four can negotiate over the heads of the German people. Open negotiations will show Germans in East and West that the basic obstacle to achieving unity lies in Soviet control and exploitation of the Eastern zone and that the Kremlin is not prepared to gamble away one iota of its power over East Germany unless it can be sure of extending its grip to all Germany.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



Is U.S. Too Fast—or Too Slow?

The United States is again at one of the critical crossroads in world affairs where every decision we take, or fail to take, is closely watched by both friends and enemies for an indication of the American people's real state of mind. At home we have become so absorbed in the election campaign that even such well-informed citizens as members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors who attended President Truman's 300th press conference on April 17 did not give foreign policy

priority in their questions. Abroad, the Soviet government, taking advantage of our period of presidential interregnum, continues to offer the bait of unification to the Germans and trade opportunities to our West European allies.

Meanwhile, our friends in Europe as well as in the underdeveloped countries raise searching—and contradictory—questions about American foreign policy. According to some Europeans, the United States is going too fast. According to

spokesmen for Asian, Arab and Latin American countries, the United States is too slow. This country is simultaneously pictured as hare and tortoise.

Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, in her address to the Netherlands-America Foundation in New York on April 8, suggested that the United States is rushing events too much in Europe. "One of our Western weaknesses," she said, "is our underrating the value of the factor of time. Of course, acting quickly on

the spot and to the point is right in all those cases where one is sure of what one does. But rash and ill-considered action is often wrong. In the terrible hurry in which we live today we are constantly tempted to take rash decisions. A hasty action is dangerous, and forcing a situation is always wrong."

The Economic Dilemma

The United States has urged the Western European nations to integrate their economies as rapidly as possible by reducing or abolishing tariffs. Our NATO allies, however, complain that while we want them to move fast in the direction of a free economy, we are slow to follow our own advice. Italy on January 15 and Britain on April 9, in notes addressed to Washington, expressed concern about various measures which threaten their exports to the United States.

Among these measures are the "Buy American" legislation which requires the United States government to buy domestic goods unless the price of comparable foreign products is 25 percent or more below our price; protests by American producers of bicycles, chinaware and other products against imports of these goods on grounds of "hardship"; and recent restrictions on imports of dairy products which have adversely affected France, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, announcing his reply of April 16 to the Italian note, declared that "inconsistencies" between trade pronouncements by the United States and its actual practices injure not only American interests but "the defense of the free world against aggression." In the long run, he said, "American interests will suffer."

If the Western European nations think we go too fast in Europe, they

are even more fearful, of what they regard as undue haste on our part in fostering the independence aspirations of colonial peoples. The French, particularly, hold the United States largely responsible for the present state of unrest in the Middle East and in North Africa where, they contend, Americans have rashly encouraged nationalist movements, thereby endangering the economic and strategic interests of the West, including those of the United States. Asian and Arab leaders, for their part, express disappointment that the United States, once the spearhead of the anticolonial movement, has suffered what they regard as a case of arrested anticolonialism.

The Colonial Dilemma

These conflicting views came to a head in April during discussion of the Tunisian question in the United Nations. The nationalist leaders of Tunisia, a French protectorate, removed from office and arrested by French authorities, sought to present their case to the UN Security Council. France, contending that its controversy with the Tunisian nationalists is a matter of domestic jurisdiction, opposed consideration of the Tunisian request in the UN forum. When 11 Asian and Arab countries, under the leadership of Pakistan, pressed for submission of the Tunisian case to the Security Council, France told the United States that if Washington supported the Tunisians, it would endanger the government of Premier Antoine Pinay and risk losing French support of NATO. Faced by this choice between offending one of the key countries of Western Europe and a group of nations representing Asian and Arab views, the United States reluctantly abstained from voting, and the Tunisian request was consequently kept off the Security Council agenda. Nationalist China

joined the U.S.S.R., Brazil and Chile in supporting Pakistan.

Washington justifies its decision by the need to retain France's support in NATO and to maintain the air bases we are building in French North Africa. From the point of view of peoples which either have recently been emancipated from colonial rule or are still subjects of Western colonial powers. Washington's action in the Tunisian case seems a betrayal of principles often proclaimed by American spokesmen. During the week when the United States opposed the Tunisian request in the UN, President Truman, in a speech prepared for the National Conference on International Economic Development on April 8, spoke sympathetically about the desire of underdeveloped peoples "to establish their own free political and economic institutions." These peoples, he said, cannot achieve scientific progress without political freedom. "Above all," he declared, "we want to help them find out and apply the secret of our own success, the secret of our American Revolution." Speaking at the same conference, Associate Justice William O. Douglas proposed on April 7 that this country promote "peasants' revolutions" in underdeveloped areas where we give Point Four technical assistance so as to end economic serfdom.

It would be unfair of our friends, whether in Europe or in the colonial areas, to expect the United States to produce a foreign policy consistently pleasing to everybody. No great power in history has had such a policy. But the United States, to a greater extent than other powers, invokes moral principles as the basis of foreign policy decisions. Today our various friends abroad increasingly urge us to reconcile our practices with our principles.

VERA MICHELES DEAN



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON LATIN AMERICA

Brazil: Portrait of Half a Continent, edited by T. Lynn Smith and Alexander Marchant. New York, Dryden Press, 1951. \$5.75.

Every aspect of Brazilian life is covered in this excellent composite study of the largest country in the New World in terms of area, and the second largest in terms of population. Well-documented and illustrated with striking photographs, the volume is a valuable addition to the material available in English on this important "good neighbor."

The Position of America and Other Essays, by Alfonso Reyes. New York, Knopf, 1950. \$5.

The first appearance in English of some of the writings of Alfonso Reyes, one of Mexico's leading men of letters, is an important contribution to the understanding of Latin American culture. Harriet de Onís did the excellent translation.

Birth of a World: Bolívar in Terms of His Peoples, by Waldo Frank. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951. \$5.

In this biography of a continent as well as of a man, the author performs a real service in giving the story of a too little-known American, whose fight for independence and dreams of a free and peaceful world entitle him to be honored as one of the great men of the New World.

The Perón Era, by Robert J. Alexander. New York, Columbia, \$3.50.

This first study in English devoted to the Peronista regime describes its imperialistic aspirations, Perón's relations with the Communists, the church, the army and the press, including the recent *La Prensa* incident, and the important role played by Evita Perón. The author, assistant professor of economics at Rutgers University, who has spent considerable time in Argentina, warns the United States against the growth

of a united front of Latin American military dictatorships headed by Juan Perón.

Herbert Hoover's Latin-American Policy, by Alexander DeConde. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1951. \$3.

Study of the United States Foreign Relations volumes and access to the Hoover papers have enabled Dr. DeConde to present documentation for his evaluation of President Hoover's policy as one based on frank and friendly cooperation with our sister republics. The author maintains that the "Good Neighbor" policy, both in name and deed, was initiated by Herbert Hoover.

The Republic of Panama in World Affairs, 1903-1950, by Lawrence Ealy. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. \$4.

An insight into the effect the existence of the Panama Canal has had on the domestic and external affairs of the Republic of Panama is given in this history of a strategic Latin American nation. The struggle for Panama's independence from the United States is recounted—from the 1903 Panamanian revolt, which the United States encouraged, to the present day, when intervention is mainly economic.

BOOKS ON WESTERN CULTURE

Ideas and Men, by Crane Brinton. New York, Prentice-Hall, 1950. \$6.

A guidebook rather than a digest or survey of Western thought, this volume by a distinguished intellectual historian communicates the author's sense of his "adventure in ideas" as he discusses some of the cosmological and ethical questions which have fascinated Western man through the centuries.

The Hebrew Impact on Western Civilization, edited by Dagobert D. Runes. New York, Philosophical Library, 1951. \$10.

This symposium by a distinguished group of scholars discusses the impressive contri-

butions of the Jews to the religious, political, artistic and scientific traditions of the Western world, in essays which range from a mere catalogue of the facts to philosophical interpretation.

The Lost Library, by Walter Mchring. New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1951. \$3.50.

The refugee narrator reassembles the books of his father's library, which represent a bulwark of enlightenment and resistance to totalitarian thought-control, and recounts the tragic tale of the disintegration of Western culture since 1914. Urbane and witty, this autobiography of a heritage is also deeply moving.

BOOKS ON RUSSIA

Cracks in the Kremlin Wall, by Edward Crankshaw. New York, Viking, 1951. \$3.50.

The author of the well-known *Russia and the Russians*, who was attached to the British military mission in Russia during World War II, points out the weaknesses in the Soviet system, which he believes are too often overlooked in American discussions about the threatening power of the U.S.S.R.

Negotiating with the Russians, edited by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1951. \$3.50.

The editors of this very interesting volume had the constructive idea of inviting ten Americans who have negotiated with the Russians concerning a wide range of problems to describe their experience and present their conclusions. The two principal conclusions they reach are that in spite of disappointments and setbacks the free world should be prepared to engage in further negotiations with the U.S.S.R., and that such negotiations are seldom useful or successful unless the international political climate is favorable.

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

**Constitutional Crisis
in South Africa**

by Gwendolen M. Carter, Chairman of the
Department of Government, Smith College,
who visited South Africa in 1948-49

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